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Does corporate investment efficiency affect corporate 
disclosure practices? 
Abstract 
Purpose: We examine the impact of corporate investment efficiency on corporate voluntary 
disclosure for a sample of UK non-financial companies. 
Design: We use a sample of FTSE All Share firms for the period 2007-2014. Disclosure scores 
are collected from Corporate Financial Information Environment (CFIE). We follow Biddle et al. 
(2009) and Chen et al. (2011) in measuring corporate investment efficiency. 
Findings: We find that high level of performance-related disclosure is associated with high level 
of corporate investment efficiency, while high level of good news information is associated with 
low level of corporate investment efficiency. We also find evidence on a bidirectional relation 
between disclosure and corporate investment efficiency.  
Research implications: Our findings would be of importance to stakeholders and corporations. 
Stakeholders’ investment decisions could be facilitated by understanding the disclosures provided 
by their firms and how these firms’ performance is presented. Corporations become aware of the 
language, which must be used to signal their performance.  
Originality: Our paper adds to disclosure studies by introducing a new variable, corporate 
investment efficiency, as a determinant of corporate disclosure practice. 
Keywords: Corporate investment efficiency, voluntary disclosure, disclosure tone, United 
Kingdom 
1. Introduction 
We examine the impact of corporate investment efficiency on the voluntary disclosure practices 
for UK firms. The UK is an interesting context because majority of narrative sections of corporate 
annual reports are voluntary in nature. We add to accounting literature on the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure by introducing new variable, corporate investment efficiency, as a potential 
driver for disclosure. We are interested to see if high level of corporate investment efficiency 
motivates UK firms to voluntarily disclose more performance-related information or less good/bad 
news information in their annual report narratives. While prior research provides evidence that 
information asymmetry (e.g. level of disclosure) affects corporate investment efficiency (Lai et 
al., 2014) – Although this may be the case -  we argue that corporate investment efficiency might 
be an indicator of a good internal control system, good governance system, and an indicator for 
quality management. We,argue, believe higher levels of investment efficiency might be associated 
with less information asymmetry and more disclosure in the annual report narratives. We revisit 
 
3 
 
the efficiency- disclosure literature  and test to see if the is any relationship between the variables 
in a sample of UK firms. We also examine if there is a bidirectional relationship between corporate 
investment efficiency and disclosure practice. 
We use Biddle et al. (2009) and Chen et al. (2011) measurements of investment efficiency. The 
disclosure scores were downloaded from the CFIE site, measuring voluntary disclosure by the total 
number of words “Wordcountsum”and the net positive keywords divided by positive plus negative 
keywords “net_tone_performance” of the performance commentaries (El-Haj et al., 2019). 
We find that investment efficiency affects voluntary disclosure of performance indicators 
positively which is consistent with signalling theory. As when firms invest efficiently, an increased 
level of transparency would give a positive signal to stakeholders, and thereof improves the firms’ 
image and reputation. On the other hand, we find that disclosure tone is negatively affected by 
investment efficiency levels. Proprietary costs theory explains this association; firms’ competitive 
advantage is protected by not disclosing good news information regarding the boost in investment 
efficiency. This finding also might suggest that firms with inefficient investment decision may 
disclose more good news information to convince their stakeholders that such low level of 
investment efficient is not an indicator for the long-term success of the firm. They might disclose 
more good news information to explain why such inefficiencyarises and when the firm will 
improve its efficiency. Finally, we find a bidirectional relationship between corporate investment 
efficiency and disclosure practice. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; section 3 discusses 
the method. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
On one hand, the impact of voluntary disclosure on corporate investment efficiency has been 
investigated in the literature. Cheng et al. (2013) find that internal control weakness disclosures 
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improve investment efficiency through better monitoring and increased financial reporting quality. 
In addition, Lai et al. (2014) and Al-Hadi et al. (2016) conclude that increasing market risk 
disclosures or disclosures in general in terms of quantity and quality boost a firm’s investment 
efficiency. The literature also shows that raising the reporting level of corporate social 
responsibility, future cash flows and capital stock would reduce investment inefficiencies (Dutta 
and Nezlobin, 2017; Zhong and Gao, 2017). Guttman and Meng (2018) find that managers may 
over invest in information acquisition and choose risky projects where there is higher cost of 
ignorance at the investment stage due to the voluntary nature of disclosure leading to these 
inefficiencies. So, literature concludes that corporate disclosure leads to an improvement in 
corporate investment efficiency.  
On the other hand, considering investment efficiency as a determinant of corporate disclosure is 
justified as follows. According to Bamber et al. (2010), top executives exert unique and 
economically significant influence (manager-specific fixed effects) on their firms’ voluntary 
disclosures. For example, managers with finance and accounting background favour more accurate 
disclosure styles. Baik et al. (2011) state that consistent with Trueman’s (1986) theory, the 
likelihood and frequency of management earnings forecasts increase with CEO ability. Baik et al. 
(2017) conclude that as managers have higher equity incentives (ability), firms’ information 
environment (broader than the specific financial reporting disclosures) improves. Gul et al. (2018) 
find that higher managerial ability increases audit fees, a proxy for financial reporting quality, for 
financially distressed firms and vice versa for non-distressed ones. In addition, Abernathy et al. 
(2018) find that managerial ability has a positive influence on the timeliness of financial reporting. 
These studies suggest that there is a link between managerial ability and voluntary disclosure. The 
main measurement of managerial ability is the MA-score developed by Demerjian et al. 
(2012).The score generates an estimate of how efficiently managers use their firms’ resources. 
Firms use inputs like Cost of Goods Sold (COGS), selling and administrative expenses, net 
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Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E), net Research and Development (R&D) and purchased 
goodwill to generate outputs such as revenues or income (Demerjian et al., 2013). Higher ability 
managers must generate higher revenues from their available set of resources than other members 
in the same industry (Habib and Hasan, 2018; Lee et al., 2018). Therefore, it is expected that 
corporate investment efficiency can be a precise proxy for managerial ability. Therefore, our study 
examines the impact of increased management ability in terms of higher investment efficiency on 
firms’ voluntary disclosure. 
Chen et al. (2017) investigate the bidirectional relationship between investment efficiency and 
investment transparency. They find no impact of investment transparency on investment 
efficiency, this contradicts the results of Biddle et al. (2009) and Gomariz and Ballesta (2014) who 
suggest that financial reporting quality (FRQ) mitigates investment inefficiencies through reducing 
information asymmetry. The lack of association could be due to the unconfirmed managers’ 
forecasts regarding projects’ profitability. Thus, the reduction of information asymmetry, in this 
case, turns to be less effective. 
Chen et al. (2017) argue that a negative association between investment efficiency and disclosure 
indicates that managers with inefficient investment decision may disclose more information to 
justify their deviations from optimal investments. 
We examine the effect of corporate investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure. Voluntary 
disclosure is considered broader term than investment transparency. As voluntary disclosure refers 
to the willingness of disclosing any type of information related to the firm. While investment 
transparency considers only certain projects’ capital expenditure announcements when 
determining the disclosure quality, which is the measurement of investment transparency as 
indicated by Chen et al. (2017). To solve the limitation of having investment transparency as a 
narrower scope, voluntary disclosure was considered. As when firms invest efficiently or 
inefficiently this does not only impact the transparency about investments but also various 
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operating and financial aspects. Therefore, investigating performance commentary in annual report 
narratives indicates how firms’ disclosure on performance-related information such as profits, 
expenditures, productivity and cash flows are affected by their levels of investment efficiency. In 
addition, the sample investigated includes UK listed firms unlike that of Chen et al. (2017) which 
investigate Australian firms, and so results might be different as the economic conditions are. 
Accordingly, either a positive or a negative impact of corporate investment efficiency on voluntary 
disclosure can be found. In case of a positive impact, firms investing efficiently tend to disclose 
more to attract potential investors, satisfy current shareholders, calm down lenders and creditors, 
and reduce information asymmetries and costs of equity financing. While if there is a negative 
effect, this result will be similar to that of Chen et al. (2017). When firms over or under-invest, 
firms are more encouraged to use impression management (Godfrey et al., 2003; Aerts, 2005). 
Managers would be eager to disclose more by giving a self-serving view to stakeholders to control 
and modify their impressions about firms’ performance (Courtis, 2004; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; 
Leung et al., 2015). We expect that corporate investment efficiency could impact both 
performance-related and good news information in annual report narratives. We, therefore, 
formulate the following hypotheses:  
H1: Corporate investment efficiency has an impact on levels of voluntary disclosure. 
H2: Corporate investment efficiency has an impact on net disclosure tone levels. 
3. Research methodology 
3.1 Data collection and sample selection 
We collect data for non-financial FTSE all share index from 2007 until 2014. We exclude financial 
companies due to the highly regulated disclosure environment they have to comply with 
(Athanasakou and Hussainey, 2014). The sample period was chosen to cover the economic crisis 
year (2008) and the years after in order to analyse its long-term consequences. Lancaster’s (CFIE) 
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list of UK annual reports narrative disclosures scores only provide data until 2014, therefore the 
sample’s period ends that year.  
The UK context was selected for a number of reasons. First, narrative reporting in the UK is mainly 
voluntary, thus regulatory and litigation costs are low compared to other countries such as US and 
Canada (La Porta et al., 2006; Aerts and Tarca, 2010). Second, there are considerable parts of 
UK’s annual report narratives that are not verifiable or auditable (Athanasakou and Hussainey, 
2014), so it is interesting to examine motivations of such disclosure. Third, UK annual reports 
have a significant level of impression management regarding firms’ performance (Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2006). Therefore, we focus on the UK to test factors affecting the voluntary sections of 
annual reports’ narrative reporting. 
The FTSE all-share index was filtered to only include in the sample companies, which continue to 
be listed between 2007 until 2014 accounting for 256 firm-year observations. 
Corporate investment efficiency and control variables’ data were collected from the Bloomberg 
database. Then, investment efficiency and control variables’ data were matched with the existing 
disclosure scores (from CFIE).   
The number of companies that have available investment efficiency, control variables and 
voluntary performance commentary disclosure scores (first proxy) are 151 with a total of 
441observations. While for the disclosure tone (second proxy), the number of companies with 
available investment efficiency, control variables and disclosure tone scores are 151 with 428 
observations. 
The selected sample includes 9 different industrial sectors categorized according to Bloomberg 
database over the period 2007-2014, as shown in table (1). The industrial sector represents the 
highest number of companies among other sectors of 33.77%, while the lowest numbers of 
companies are from the telecommunications sector forming only 2.66% of the total companies.  
INSERT TABLE (1) HERE 
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Variables measurements 
Dependent variable 
The two proxies for the dependent variable voluntary disclosure are expressed in this section, 
explaining why these proxies were selected and from which source. 
First proxy “Wordcountsum” 
To obtain the disclosure scores, the CFIE Wmatrix-import web tool which permits batch scoring 
of UK annual report narratives was used1. Wmatrix has the ability to process unstructured annual 
reports in an electronic format and produce word count frequencies based on predetermined 
dictionaries (Pappas, 2015; Lewis and Young, 2019; El-Haj et al., 2019; El-Haj et al., 2019). CFIE 
collects electronic versions of the UK reports for the years 2002-2014.The collection started from 
2007 and ends in 2014, covering the period during and after the economic crisis; moreover, to 
maintain the consistency between the other samples’ period of our study.   
The considered sections of UK annual reports were the performancecommentaries, which discuss 
any aspect of operating activities, or financial performance that is why they were taken into 
consideration instead of the overall voluntary disclosure. The overall voluntary disclosure is more 
general, as it includes, for example, CSR reports, remuneration reports or governance statements, 
which might not reflect a firm’s investment efficiency or inefficiency practices as the performance 
commentaries can do. 
The total number of words of a section “s” in an annual report was used as a proxy, known as 
wordcountsum. Therefore, disclosure scores attained as data gathered were the word count for the 
aggregate performance commentary identified as wordcountsum_Perform. The performance-
related keywords as searched for by Wmatrix software are as follows: 
Performance keywords (# stands for any number of characters): 
                                                          
1 The CFIE Wmatrix web import tool is available at https://cfie.lancaster.ac.uk:8443/.   
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Sales Revenue 
Revenues Turnover 
Trading Cost 
Costs Expense 
Expenses Income 
Earnings e.p.s 
Profit Profits 
Profitability Loss 
Losses Margin 
Margins Result 
Results 
 
Second proxy “Disclosure tone” 
Continuing with UK annual reports performance commentaries and for being more specific and 
narrowing the focus, disclosure tone was selected as a reflection of a company’s performance. 
Given the same time interval and source of data, the net positive keywords divided by positive 
plus negative keywords for the performance commentary were selected known as 
net_tone_performance. Therefore, disclosure tone is a dependent variable reflecting the percentage 
of good news relative to the total of good and bad news combined together. This variable is crucial 
for companies that have changes in investment efficiencies by checking the impact of such changes 
on not only the level of voluntary disclosure but also the tone of their discussion in the form of 
being good or bad news about the companies. Examples of negativity keywords include disappoint, 
risk, threat, fail,…etc. and examples of positivity keywords include delighted, rewards, 
successes,…etc., all are searched for on the CFIE Wmatrix site2. 
Independent and control variables 
Our independent variable is corporate investment efficiency. We use the two most commonly used 
proxies (Biddle et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011) to measure this variable. Second, we choose the 
                                                          
2The links to positivity and negativity keywords are available at http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/cfie/files/HenryNeg2006.txt 
and http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/cfie/files/HenryPos2008.txt 
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control variables based on prior studies (Barako et al., 2006; Lan et al., 2013; Ressas and 
Hussainey, 2014; Habbash et al., 2016; Aly et al., 2018). 
Investment efficiency’s first proxy  
Chen et al. (2011) measure investment efficiency as deviations from expected investment using a 
model that forecasts investment as a function of growth opportunities. This measurement is 
consistent with Biddle et al. (2009) for measuring investment efficiency. Principally, Hubbard 
(1998) estimates a prudent model for expected investment as a function of sales growth. Since the 
relation between investment and sales growth could differ between sales declines and sales boosts, 
a linear regression model is employed to consent a differential predictability for sales fluctuations: 
Investi,t=α0+ α1NEGi,t-1+ α2SalesGrowthi,t-1+ α3NEG*SalesGrowthi,t-1+εi,t      (1) 
In equation 1, Investi,t is the total investment of firm i in year t, defined as the net increase in 
tangible and intangible assets and scaled by lagged total assets3. SalesGrowthi,t-1is the annual sales 
growth rate for firm iin year t-1 and NEGi,t-1is an indicator variable which takes the value of one 
for negative sales growth and a zero otherwise (Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014). 
Calculating investment efficiency or inefficiency occurs by multiplying the absolute value of the 
residuals by negative 1 since both over or underinvestment reflects an unfavorable sign about the 
efficiency level. Therefore, the residuals from the regression model reveal the deviation from the 
expected investment level indicating that those residuals are used as a firm-specific proxy for 
investment inefficiency. A positive residual means that the firm is making investments at a higher 
rate than estimated according to the sales growth, so it will overinvest. In contrast, a negative 
residual assumes that real investment is less than the estimated, reflecting an underinvestment.  
                                                          
3Chen et al. (2011) and Biddle et al. (2009) are two measurements differing in the part of forecasting investments as 
a function of growth opportunities. The investment is calculated by Chen et al. (2011) as the net increase in tangible 
and intangible assets and scaled by lagged total assets. So the available data for assets purchased or disposed is 
accounted for, unlike Biddle et al. (2009) measurement of investment which specifies certain items for measuring. 
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Investment efficiency’s second proxy 
The most frequently used proxy for investment efficiency is the one proposed by Richardson 
(2006) and Biddle et al. (2009). A firm’s total investment for a given year, indicated in equation 2 
by Investment (I), is measured as the sum of R&D, capital expenditures, and acquisition 
expenditures minus the cash receipts from the sales of PPE multiplied by 100 and scaled by average 
total assets: 
It = RDt + CAPEXt + Acquisitionst – SalePPEt(2) 
This measurement of investment is clearly distinguished from other ones since it takes into 
consideration various investment classes by including capital expenditures, acquisitions, sales of 
assets and R&D. These investment types incorporate a significant importance nowadays, unlike 
old previous research, which studied and discussed these components individually.  
The abnormal element of investment or the residuals reflected in the error term are then used as a 
proxy for investment inefficiency levels by determining whether there is an over or 
underinvestment. Biddle et al. (2009) state that investment inefficiency takes values between zero 
and one, where zero or values close to zero indicates underinvestment, while one or values close 
to one specifies overinvestment. 
Voluntary disclosure control variables (first proxy “Wordcountsum”) 
According to previous literature, firm size, leverage, profitability, liquidity, growth, and age are 
considered the main determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure. Firm size is measured by the 
natural logarithm of assets (Cooke, 1989a; Hassan et al., 2006; Al-Hadi et al., 2016; Mohamed 
and Schwienbacher, 2016). Leverage or gearing of a company is measured through the book value 
of debt to total assets ratio (Eng and Mak, 2003; Al-Hadi et al., 2016). For measuring profitability, 
a firm’s ROA ratio is used (Habbash et al., 2016). The current ratio is used to account for firms’ 
liquidity to test the ability of funds to meet their short-term obligations (Watson et al., 2002; 
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Barako et al., 2006; Lan et al., 2013). Firms’ growth rate is determined by the change in sales from 
one year to another (Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015). In addition, the company’s age is expressed 
as the natural logarithm of the number of years’ since their establishment (Hossain, 2008; Sehar et 
al., 2013; Habbash et al., 2016). 
Voluntary disclosure control variables (second proxy “Disclosure tone”) 
For our model, when we use disclosure tone as a dependent variable to test H2, we use a number 
of control variables. Firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets (Hackston and 
Milne, 1996; Kang and Gray, 2011; Hassan et al., 2006; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014; Aly et al., 
2018). Financial leverage is proxied for by the total debt to total assets (Barako et al., 2006; Ressas 
and Hussainey, 2014; Aly et al., 2018). Firm profitability, a firm’s ROA ratio is used (Kun Wang 
et al., 2008; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014). LOSS is a dummy variable for reporting a net loss 
(Rogers et al., 2011). Firms’ growth rate is calculated as the change in sales from one year to 
another (Ressas and Hussainey, 2014; Hassanein and Hussainey, 2015; Aly et al., 2018). Market-
to-book ratio is employed to control for a company’s investment opportunity and growth potential 
(Martikainen et al., 2016; Czerney et al., 2017). DIV is a dummy variable for dividend payments 
(Hussainey and Aal-Eisa, 2009; Ressas and Hussainey, 2014) and firm age is shown as the natural 
logarithm of the number of years’ since their establishment (Muttakin and Khan, 2014; Aly et al., 
2018). 
3.2 Research model 
The relationship between the dependent variable voluntary disclosure (first proxy “VOLDIS” and 
second proxy “DISTONE”), the independent variable corporate investment efficiency and the 
control variables can be expressed in the following regression models. Models 1 and 2 show the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure first proxy “VOLDIS” and both of investment efficiency 
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measurements. Models 3 and 4 present the association between voluntary disclosure second proxy 
“DISTONE” and investment efficiency measurements. 
VOLDISi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(1)i,t + β2FSi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4PROFi,t + β5LIQi,t + β6SGi,t + β7AGEi,t 
+ ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies +ɛi,t(Model 1) 
 
VOLDISi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(2)i,t + β2FSi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4PROFi,t + β5LIQi,t + β6SGi,t + β7AGEi,t 
+ ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies + εi,t(Model 2) 
 
Where; 
 VOLDIS= Voluntary disclosure 
 INVEFF(1)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 1) 
 INVEFF(2)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 2) 
 FS= Firm size 
 LEV= Financial leverage 
 PROF= Firm profitability 
 LIQ= Firm liquidity 
 SG= Firm’s sales growth 
 AGE= Firm age 
 ε = Error term 
 
DISTONEi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(1)i,t + β2FSi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4PROFi,t + β5LOSSi,t + β6SGi,t + 
β7MTBi,t + β8DIVi,t + β9AGEi,t+∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies +ɛi,t(Model 3) 
 
DISTONEi,t = β0 + β1INVEFF(2)i,t + β2FSi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4PROFi,t + β5LOSSi,t + β6SGi,t + 
β7MTBi,t + β8DIVi,t + β9AGEi,t + ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies + εi,t(Model 4) 
 
Where; 
 DISTONE= Disclosure tone 
 INVEFF(1)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 1) 
 INVEFF(2)= Corporate investment efficiency (measurement 2) 
 FS= Firm size 
 LEV= Financial leverage 
 PROF= Firm profitability 
 LOSS= A binary variable (1 if a firm reported negative net income and 0 otherwise) 
 SG= Firm’s sales growth 
 MTB= Market-to-book ratio 
 DIV= A binary variable (1 if a firm paid out dividends and 0 otherwise) 
 AGE= Firm age 
 ε = Error term 
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4. Empirical Findings 
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation 
Table (2) shows that the average of the investment efficiency in both models is around zero (0.0002 
and -0.0005 respectively) which is a good indication of the samplefirms. As values become closer 
to zero, investment efficiency becomes higher (Gomariz and Ballesta, 2014). As for the dependent 
variables, VOLDIS and DISTONE, voluntary disclosure (VOLDIS) have a mean of 3.96, which 
indicates that 9104 words of the keywords are about performance actually disclosed by the firms 
of the sample. Disclosure tone (DISTONE) has a mean of 0.328, which indicates that only 0.33% 
of the performance keywords actually reflect good news and are disclosed by the sample firms. 
The mean firm size for UK firms is 1,799,360,000 (3.20) billion British Pound as the value of firm 
assets. Financial leverage (LEV) has a mean of 20.3% indicating that the sample firms are not 
highly leveraged (Habbash et al., 2016). Firm profitability (PROF) reflects an average of 0.064; 
Firm liquidity (LIQ) has a mean of 1.43; Firm sales growth (SG) has a mean of 7.24 similar to 
Hassanein and Hussainey (2015) findings. Capital expenditure to total assets (CAPTA) has an 
average of 0.039. The average firm has been in existence for 65 years (as 1.802 is after applying 
the natural logarithm).The analysis also shows that firm loss (LOSS) has a mean of 0.077; Market-
to-book ratio (MTB) has an average of 1.664 and dividends distribution (DIV) has a mean of 0.936. 
As for correlation results, tables (3) and (4) show that both models of investment efficiency (err 
and err2) have an insignificant positive relationship with voluntary disclosure and an insignificant 
negative one with disclosure tone. Considering the control variables, FS and LEV show a positive 
significant relationship with VOLDIS, with a 99% and 95% confidence levels respectively. The 
remaining variables have an insignificant relation with VOLDIS, with respect to liquidity having 
a negative association. PROF, SG, and MTB show a positive significant relationship with 
DISTONE, having a 99% confidence levels. Also, LOSS has a significant but negative relationship 
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with DISTONE with a confidence level of 99%. The remaining control variables FS, DIV, LEV, 
and AGE have an insignificant relationship, as FS and LEV have a negative relation while DIV 
and AGE has a positive relation. 
INSERT TABLES (2), (3) and (4) HERE 
Regression analysis 
Table (5) shows that the independent variable (err2) in the second model for measuring INVEFF 
has a positive significant relationship with VOLDIS. The first model’s variable (err) still has a 
negative insignificant relation with VOLDIS. The second model’s results are supported by 
signaling theory, as Foster (1986) and Inchausti (1997) state that profitable well-performing firm 
managers are encouraged to disclose more. Disclosure is considered one of the signaling means to 
attract investments, improve firms’ reputation and justify managers’ compensation (Ross, 1977; 
Verrecchia, 1983; Campbell et al., 2002). Investing efficiently is a sign of good performance and 
so disclosing such information would achieve the stated benefits. Therefore, accepting and 
supporting H1. 
As for the control variables for both models, FS shows a positive significant relation with VOLDIS 
with a 99% confidence level, while PROF has a positive significant relation with confidence level 
90% for model 1 only. The remaining control variables reveal an insignificant association with 
VOLDIS with respect to LEV and AGE having a positive relationship and LIQ and SG having a 
positive one.   
INSERT TABLE (5) 
Considering DISTONE as the dependent variable 
Table (6) presents the results of testing the relationship between investment efficiency and 
disclosure tone. It shows that INVEFF for model 1 (err “Chen et al. (2011)”) has a significant 
relationship with DISTONE while model 2 (err2 “Biddle et al. (2009)”) has an insignificant one. 
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The results obtained support Chen et al. (2017) findings for over-investment as they find a negative 
association between INVEFF and transparency. Therefore, H2 will be accepted. When firms are 
having investment inefficiencies through over or under-investing, they would try to cover these 
inefficiencies through disclosing more good news. Managers would never give a negative 
impression about the firm by disclosing the true investment decisions or activities (Aerts, 2005; 
Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Leung et al., 2015). On the opposite, if managers were undertaking 
efficient investment opportunities, they would not be eager to disclose such kind of information. 
As according to the proprietary costs theory, firms must be aware of the costs of information 
dissemination if disclosing too much information, which could result in the damage of their 
competitive advantage (Verrecchia, 1983; McKinnon, 1984). 
Considering the control variables, SG and MTB show a positive significant relation with 
DISTONE with confidence levels of 99% for SG while 90% and 95% for MTB in the two models 
respectively. LOSS and AGE have a negative significant association with DISTONE with 90% 
and 95% as well. On the contrary, FS, LEV, PROF and DIV have an insignificant relationship 
with DISTONE. 
INSERT TABLE (6) 
4.4 Additional analysis: The bidirectional relationship between disclosure and investment 
efficiency 
According to Velte (2019) the bidirectional relationship between investment efficiency and 
disclosure would be of major importance to discuss. The other way round relationship between 
corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure was tested by previous studies discussed 
earlier in the literature review section (Cheng et al., 2013; Lai et al., 2014). Considering the effect 
of voluntary disclosure on corporate investment efficiency is a main concern, so testing that 
relationship using the appropriate control variables used by prior research was important. Table 
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(7) gives an overview of the additional analysis results testing this relationship using the Heckman 
Model. This model is considered a more robust methodology to address that direction of 
association. To address the possible reversed causality, the Heckman test was conducted on the 
investment efficiency–disclosure link using the following models: 
erri,t = β0 + β1Logwordcounti,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CurrentRatioi,t + β6AGEi,t + 
β7MtoBi,t + β8CFOSi,t + β9STDCFOi,t + β10STDSi,t + β11TANGi,t + β12ZSCOREi,t + β13DIVi,t + 
β14LOSSi,t +  ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies +ɛi,t(Model 1) 
 
err2i,t = β0 + β1Logwordcounti,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CurrentRatioi,t + β6AGEi,t + 
β7MtoBi,t + β8CFOSi,t + β9STDCFOi,t + β10STDSi,t + β11TANGi,t + β12ZSCOREi,t + β13DIVi,t + 
β14LOSSi,t +  ∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies +ɛi,t(Model 2) 
 
erri,t = β0 + β1TONEi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CurrentRatioi,t + β6AGEi,t + β7MtoBi,t + 
β8CFOSi,t + β9STDCFOi,t + β10STDSi,t + β11TANGi,t + β12ZSCOREi,t + β13DIVi,t + β14LOSSi,t +  
∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies +ɛi,t(Model 3) 
 
err2i,t = β0 + β1TONEi,t + β2SIZEi,t + β3LEVi,t + β4ROAi,t + β5CurrentRatioi,t + β6AGEi,t + β7MtoBi,t + 
β8CFOSi,t + β9STDCFOi,t + β10STDSi,t + β11TANGi,t + β12ZSCOREi,t + β13DIVi,t + β14LOSSi,t +  
∑Industry dummies + ∑Year dummies +ɛi,t(Model 4) 
The results of the first and second models show that voluntary disclosure has a positive significant 
effect on corporate investment efficiency with a confidence level of 99% in the response model. 
After the truncation done by the selection model, the significance reaches 90%, which indicates 
that even if after correcting the biasness of data still the association remains between both 
variables. These results are consistent with Zhong and Gao (2017), which show that CSR 
disclosure contributes to higher FRQ and thereof reduced information asymmetry and improved 
investment efficiency. In addition, Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) support these findings by 
concluding that cash flows and capital stock disclosures contribute to the efficiency of investment 
decisions.The results of the third and fourth models testing the disclosure tone impact on 
investment efficiency show insignificant relationships between the variables. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that there is a bidirectional relationship between disclosure practices and corporate 
investment efficiency, indicating that neither of these variables represent a starting point for firms 
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to take care of. Both firms’ investment efficiency and disclosure practices lead to each other, which 
encourage managers to assign the same level of attention and importance to them.  
5. Summary 
We aimed to test the effect of corporate investment efficiency on voluntary disclosure. The sample 
was selected from FTSE all share index for the period from 2007 until 2014. We find that 
investment efficiency affects voluntary disclosure (first measurement) positively for the second 
model only (Biddle et al., 2009). Consistent with the signaling theory, an increased level of 
transparency when firms invest efficiently would act as a positive signal to stakeholders, and 
thereof improves managers’ image, firms’ reputation and the ability to raise equity when needing. 
Vice versa in a situation of over or under investment, the non-disclosure of such information would 
protect managers from being replaced or a decline that might happen on the share price. On the 
other side, the inefficiency of investments would not be of good news to be shared with a firm’s 
stakeholders. Firms will not prefer to disclose such information, which would have an adverse 
effect on all parties. These results are not consistent with that of Chen et al. (2017) which found a 
negative effect of investment transparency on voluntary disclosure. As for the disclosure tone 
(second measurement of voluntary disclosure), the first model (Chen et al., 2011) shows a negative 
effect of investment efficiency on it. This negative association was explained by the proprietary 
costs theory as when a firm’s investment efficiency rise, managers become aware that disclosing 
more information would harm their firms’ competitive advantage. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the findings of this paper would be of great importance to 
stakeholders and corporations. Stakeholders’ investment decisions could be facilitated by 
understanding the disclosures provided by their firms and how these firms’ performance is 
presented. Also, due to the bidirectional relationship between investment efficiency and disclosure, 
stakeholders must be aware that as their decisions are affected by firms’ disclosure practices still 
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they do affect these decisions on the hand. For example, as an investor might think that it is a good 
opportunity to invest in a firm with promising disclosures, he or she should consider that this 
investment might contribute in generating more income or profits from projects, which are 
disclosed about by the management.  
The study’s limitations lie in the sample timing and voluntary disclosure measurement. The sample 
timing is from 2007 until 2014, it was better to extend it to more recent years to have a clearer 
picture for firms’ performance. The voluntary disclosure measurement considered only the 
performance commentary scores not the overall disclosure score. A justification was provided for 
both limitations; data availability was the reason for limiting the sample timing by 2014 as these 
are the only provided data by the CFIE. In addition, choosing the performance commentary was 
due to the need of being precise and explores the commentary, which most reflects a company’s 
investment efficiency performance instead of analysing an aggregate one. 
There is more than one opportunity for extending this research in the future; a comparative study 
including more than one country would be beneficial, as well as employing other investment 
efficiency and managerial ability proxies to study their effect on voluntary disclosure.  
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Table (1) 
Sample Sector Classification 
Sector No. of companies in the 
Sector 
% 
Materials 14 9.27% 
Consumer staples 12 7.95% 
Energy 7 4.64% 
Consumer discretionary 37 24.5% 
Utilities 6 3.97% 
Industrials 51 33.77% 
Telecommunications 4 2.66% 
Healthcare 6 3.97% 
IT 14 9.27% 
Total 151 100% 
 
Table (2) 
Descriptive Statistics for 2007-2014 
Variables Mean Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness 
VOLDIS 3.96 4.76 1.83 0.332 -1.850 
DISTONE 0.33 0.69 -0.12 0.15 -0.309 
INVEFF1 (err) 0.0002 24.75 -9.51 4.26 2.384 
INVEFF2 (err2) -0.0005 73.22 -54.24 10.89 2.37 
FS 3.20 5.09 1.84 0.63 0.464 
LEV 0.203 0.69 0.00 0.14 0.653 
PROF 0.064 0.70 -0.48 0.079 1.482 
LIQ 1.43 6.10 0.35 0.75 1.914 
SG 7.24 152.79 -45.16 16.23 2.063 
CAPTA 0.039 0.28 0.00 0.040 2.432 
AGE 1.802 2.47 0.00 0.389 -0.977 
LOSS 0.077 1.00 0.00 0.267 3.184 
MTB 1.66 5.47 0.55 0.738 1.695 
DIV 0.936 1.00 0.00 0.24 -3.580 
VOLDIS is voluntary disclosure measured as the word count for the aggregate performance commentary identified as 
wordcountsum_Perform; DISTONE is disclosure tone measured as the net positive keywords divided by positive plus negative 
keywords for the performance commentary selected known as net_tone_performance; INVEFF is investment efficiency measured 
by the negative and positive residuals of the investment equation; FS is firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV is firm leverage measured as total liabilities divided by total assets; PROF is firm profitability measured by the return on 
assets ratio of a firm; LIQ is firm liquidity measured by the firm’s current ratio by dividing current assets by current liabilities; SG 
is sales growth measured by the change which is sales from year to year; CAPTA is capital expenditure divided by total assets; 
AGE is firm age measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years’ since their establishment; LOSS is a dummy variable 
for reporting a net loss; MTB is market-to-book ratio; DIV is a dummy variable for dividend payments. 
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Table (3) 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for (2007-2014) 
Variables FS LEV PROF LIQ SG CAPTA AGE Err err2 VOLDIS 
FS 1 .291** -.052 -.198** -.028 .024 .110* .050 -.116** .391** 
LEV  1 -.140** -.249** -.008 .256** .073 .209** .030 .094* 
PROF   1 .036 .129** .072 .126** 0.068 .131** .006 
LIQ    1 .006 -.108* .087* -.081 -.054 -.057 
SG     1 .100* .017 .000 .000 .019 
CAPTA      1 .079 .943** .303** .020 
AGE       1 .046 -.050 .026 
Err        1 .388** .055 
err2         1 .030 
VOLDIS          1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Variable definitions: see table (2) 
Table (4) 
Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for (2007-2014) 
Variables FS LEV PROF LOSS SG MTB DIV AGE Err err2 DISONE 
FS 1 .291** -.052 -.019 -.028 -.181** -.118** .110* .050 -.116** -.046 
LEV  1 -.140** .043 -.008 -.182** .011 .063 .209** .030 -.085 
PROF   1 -.455** .129** .451** .122** .070 .068 .131** .167** 
LOSS    1 -.109* -.178** -.126** -.083 -.053 .018 -.192** 
SG     1 .101* .090* .066 .000 .000 .151** 
MTB      1 .125** -.034 .046 .170** .217** 
DIV       1 .057 .017 -.033 .050 
AGE        1 .041 -.098* .002 
Err         1 .388** -.080 
err2          1 -.060 
DISTONE           1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Variable definitions: see table (2) 
Table (5) 
Corporate investment efficiency and voluntary disclosure 
 Model 1 Model 2 Predicted sign 
Variables Coefficients Significance Coefficients Significance  
      
Constant 3.382 0.000 3.314 0.000 NA 
Err -0.013 0.772 0.126 0.003 + 
FS 0.499 0.000 0.518 0.000 + 
LEV 0.017 0.721 0.011 0.820 + 
PROF 0.079 0.079 0.060 0.180 + 
LIQ -0.014 0.754 -0.003 0.946 +/- 
SG -0.044 0.326 -0.028 0.533 + 
AGE 0.042 0.359 0.046 0.307 + 
No. of 
observations 
441 
34.3% 
441 
35.7% 
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R2 30.6% 
9.429 
0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
32.1% 
10.032 
0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Adjusted R2  
F value  
ANOVA  
Year dummy  
Industry dummy  
Variable definitions: see table (2) 
 
Table (6) 
Corporate investment efficiency and disclosure tone 
 Model 1 Model 2 Predicted 
sign 
Variables Coefficients Significance Coefficients Significance  
      
Constant 0.293 0.000 0.290 0.000 NA 
Err -0.090 0.060 -0.070 0.128 + 
FS -0.044 0.395 -0.035 0.499 + 
LEV 0.060 0.237 0.049 0.323 + 
PROF 0.075 0.306 0.066 0.365 + 
LOSS -0.099 0.054 -0.098 0.059 +/- 
SG 0.136 0.004 0.133 0.005 + 
MTB 0.123 0.054 0.135 0.037 + 
DIV 0.034 0.451 0.034 0.461 +/- 
AGE -0.097 0.036 -0.102 0.029 + 
No. of observations 428 
28.6% 
24.3% 
6.727 
0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
428 
28.3% 
24.1% 
6.656 
0.000 
Yes 
Yes 
 
R2  
Adjusted R2  
F value  
ANOVA  
Year dummy  
Industry dummy  
Variable definitions: see table (2) 
 
 
Table (7) 
The bidirectional relationship between disclosure and investment efficiency 
 
Response Equation – Investment efficiency “err” 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coefficients Significance Coefficients Significance 
Constant -8.631707 0.0000 -6.772157 0.2796 
LOGWORDCOUNT 0.311664 0.4683 4.072423 0.0067 
AGE 20.42815 0.0000 0.581889 0.6481 
CFOS -1.357017 0.0000 19.41867 0.0017 
CURRENTRATIO 0.035039 0.7004 -1.683050 0.0168 
INDUSTRY 5.613086 0.0000 -0.237745 0.3857 
LEV 0.475247 0.3394 3.976896 0.2930 
LOSS 0.594069 0.3694 4.270122 0.0261 
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MTOB -1.254236 0.0001 1.912080 0.0435 
ROA -0.256542 0.9144 11.56824 0.1120 
SIZE -0.550016 0.0690 -3.745174 0.0000 
STDCFO 18.87275 0.0006 24.53991 0.1395 
STDS -0.291113 0.8006 7.218345 0.0393 
TANG 8.072809 0.0000 -4.063407 0.0941 
ZSCORE 0.692536 0.0001 -0.857287 0.1003 
 
Selection Equation - Investment efficiency “err” 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variables Coefficients Significance Coefficients Significance 
Constant 2.011520 0.1475 1.315892 0.3559 
LOGWORDCOUNT 0.463613 0.0731 0.471640 0.0906 
AGE -0.826158 0.4605 0.223811 0.2410 
CFOS -0.228141 0.0658 0.673564 0.4722 
CURRENTRATIO -0.036212 0.5375 -0.018772 0.8509 
INDUSTRY 1.228385 0.1814 0.008634 0.8302 
LEV 0.356008 0.2408 0.682930 0.3187 
LOSS -0.258970 0.4958 0.179155 0.5432 
MTOB 0.122888 0.5958 0.091564 0.6525 
ROA 3.882709 0.0798 4.138898 0.0028 
SIZE -0.484258 0.0106 -0.528153 0.0006 
STDCFO -1.250306 0.7423 1.431628 0.5979 
STDS 0.577781 0.4782 0.659386 0.2826 
TANG -1.480475 0.0121 -1.454675 0.0007 
ZSCORE 0.019928 0.8677 -0.136134 0.2137 
 
 
 
